Equity-based Financial Slack and New Venture Performance: Evidence from matched single-founder ventures by Morgan, Horatio M.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Equity-based Financial Slack and New
Venture Performance: Evidence from
matched single-founder ventures
Horatio M. Morgan
Ryerson University
28. September 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50291/
MPRA Paper No. 50291, posted 30. September 2013 08:46 UTC
1 
 
Equity-based Financial Slack and New Venture Performance: Evidence from matched single-
founder ventures 
 
Horatio M. Morgan, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, Global Management Studies Department  
Ted Rogers School of Management 
Ryerson University 
350 Victoria Street 
Toronto, Ontario 
Canada, M5B 2K3 
E-mail: horatio.morgan@ryerson.ca 
Telephone: (416) 979-5000 ext. 2526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Equity-based Financial Slack and New Venture Performance: Evidence from matched single-
founder ventures 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether equity-based financial slack in the form of relatively high levels of 
founding equity will systematically hurt new venture performance. Drawing on data on 445 single-
founder new ventures over the period 2004-2007, it uses the propensity score matching method to 
estimate the average effect of equity-based financial slack on new venture performance. It finds a 
negative and statistically significant average effect. This implies that single-founder new ventures 
that started out with relatively high levels of founding equity subsequently had a relatively low rate 
of profitability on average. The underlying mechanisms behind this empirical finding are explored, 
and the implications for the development of existing theory and practice are discussed. 
 
JEL classification: G32, L26, M13 
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Equity-based Financial Slack and New Venture Performance: Evidence from matched single-
founder ventures 
 
1. Introduction 
Although financial slack in one form or another may matter for firm performance, its impact 
on the performance of new ventures is not fully understood. In the field of management, (positive) 
financial slack is commonly viewed as the excess financial resources that are at the disposal of 
managers when current working capital exceeds what is currently required to operate the business. 
Importantly, this working capital-based perspective provides insights into the mechanisms or 
channels through excess financial resources may inhibit or foster growth in relatively established 
firms, or those that are approaching the maturity stage of entrepreneurship (Bradley, Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2011; George, 2005; Greenley and Oktengil, 1998; Love and Nohria, 2005; Mishina, 
Polluck and Porac, 2004; Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds and Bradley, 2008; Tang and Peng, 2003; Voss, 
Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008).  
While generally useful, this working capital-based view of financial slack does not allow 
scholars to say much about the potential impact of excess financial resources on the performance of 
new ventures with little, if any, excess working capital. However, this paper argues that 
underutilized founding equity may constitute a potential form of financial slack in business startups. 
Specifically, a new venture with equity-based financial slack may be holding a relatively large share 
of founding equity in the form of precautionary savings. These savings may very well be in excess 
of what the new venture needs to grow on par with other new ventures at a similar stage of the 
entrepreneurial process. This leads to the following question that is not adequately addressed by the 
existing literature: do new ventures that start out with relatively high levels of founding equity 
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subsequently underperform relative to their counterparts that start out with relatively low levels of 
founding equity?  
To answer this question, this paper uses the propensity score matching method to quantify 
the average effect of equity-based financial slack on the performance of single-founder new 
ventures. In general terms, it provides evidence which suggests that new ventures that started out 
with relatively high levels of founding equity subsequently had a relatively low rate of profitability 
on average. This article makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, since the 
existing literature has largely focused on the effect of working capital-based financial slack on 
relatively established entrepreneurial firms (Bradley et al., 2011), it makes original contributions by 
not only conceptualizing of financial slack in terms of working capital and founding equity, but 
especially in terms of the new systematic evidence that it provides on the effect of equity-based 
financial slack on the performance of new ventures. 
Finally, this paper particularly contributes to an emerging line of research that has begun to 
closely examine how equity-based financial slack may impact the performance of new ventures. 
Perhaps the most notable example of studies along this line is that of Cavarretta and Furr (2011).  In 
their study, the authors suggest that means-based (as opposed to variance-based) statistical methods 
are unlikely to establish that equity-based financial slack has a statistically significant average effect 
on new venture performance. However, this paper has applied the propensity score matching 
method and finds a negative and statistically significant average effect. In doing so, it advances this 
research agenda. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I develop the 
theoretical framework and the main hypothesis. This is followed by a description of the data, 
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sample, measures and statistical methods. The results are then presented. The final section discusses 
the key findings and concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
According to the equity-based characterization of financial slack described above, new 
ventures may have financial slack when precautionary savings constitute a significant share of the 
initial equity contributions of founders. In principle, the decision to hold precautionary savings may 
reflect prudence on the part of founders faced with risks in the form of potential losses on business 
transactions, or higher than expected business development costs, during the birth stage of the 
entrepreneurial process. By setting aside some personal savings, the founder may be able to absorb 
unexpected losses while keeping the new venture afloat.  
The foregoing arguments suggest that new venture founders may not just be faced with a test 
of how fast they can grow their businesses, but also whether they can avoid “crashing and burning” 
in the process of doing so. This in turn implies that founders may be guided by some underlying risk 
management framework in the pursuit of sustainable growth. However, this perspective has not 
been emphasized in the burgeoning resource-growth literature that draws on Penrose’s (1959) 
theory of firm growth. This is perhaps because this theoretical perspective is essentially concerned 
about how, for a given managerial capacity, established firms may fuel growth by better utilizing 
idle liquid resources. But founders and managers in new ventures and established firms, 
respectively, seem to face a fundamentally different set of opportunities and constraints; 
alternatively, they seem to face different set of growth challenges that are perhaps best addressed on 
their own terms.  
The risk management perspective described above offers an alternative way to conceptualize 
how founders in particular may be trying to safely grow their new ventures. A central tenet is that 
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founders have incentive to hold part of the equity they invest in their own business in the form of 
precautionary savings. But if founders hold savings in reserve rather than use them to acquire 
strategic assets and new customers, or secure ideal business locations, among others; then the new 
venture may neither grow as fast as it can, nor generate the most value from the available founding 
equity. At the same time, the founder may be willing to accept a lower return on assets in exchange 
for a lower perceived risk of business failure.  
Meanwhile, Cavarretta and Furr (2011) suggest that relatively high levels of founding equity 
in new ventures may actually distract founders; that is, they may not focus on the needs of potential 
customers. In addition, they may stubbornly embrace failing business models or ideas. Thus, new 
ventures with relatively high levels of founding equity may not be as nimble and responsive to 
changes in their business environment relative to their counterparts with relatively low levels of 
founding equity. If so, the former may not rapidly acquire new customers, and may even lose what 
may be a small share of its target market. This in turn may lead to relatively low profitability.  
Altogether these arguments support the following hypothesis: relatively high levels of 
founding equity will lead to relatively low rates of profitability among new ventures that survive the 
birth stage of the entrepreneurial process. 
3. Research Method 
 
3.1. Data and Sample 
To empirically evaluate the hypothesis above, this study draws on publicly available firm-
level data on new ventures from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). This survey has tracked 4,928 
new businesses that started operations in the United States since 2004. The sample used in this study 
constitutes 445 single-founder new ventures that continuously operated over the period 2004-2007. 
Based on the descriptive statistics reported in column 1 of Table 1, the average new venture in this 
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sample is a micro service-based business that operates either in the retail, transportation or the 
information sector. In addition, this new business is likely to have been founded by a Caucasian 
male with an associate degree, and almost 15 years of working experience in the industry in which 
the business primarily operates. Finally, the founder is likely to be based either in the Midwest 
region or the South region. 
3.2.Measures 
 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is new venture performance, which is measured by return on assets 
(ROA). Although the use of sales growth is common in prior studies (Bradley et al., 2011), ROA 
was chosen in accordance with the theoretical framework developed above. Specifically, to the 
extent that the holding of relatively high levels of precautionary savings limit investment in strategic 
assets, or engender complacency among founders, the consequences are likely to be manifested in 
relatively low rates of profitability. Importantly, the data on the profits/(losses) and the assets of 
new ventures in the KFS survey are reported in the form of nine ordered value ranges (i.e. 1, $500 
or less; 2, $501 to $1,000; 3, $1,001 to $3,000; 4, $3,001 to $5,000; 5, $5,001 to $10,000; 6, 
$10,001 to $25,000; 7, $25,001 to $100,00; 8, $100,001 to $1,000,000; 9, $1,000,001 or more). 
Using the reported values 1 to 9, the ROA was estimated for each new venture in the sample.  
3.2.2. Equity-based financial slack 
Central to the notion of equity-based financial slack is the idea that new venture founders 
may hold a fraction of founding equity in the form of precautionary savings. However, data 
limitations preclude a direct measure of the share of precautionary savings in founding equity. To 
approximate the proportion of precautionary savings in founding equity, the following approach was 
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adopted. Founding equity was normalized by the number of full-time employees to yield founding 
equity per full-time employee. It was then presumed that then when founding equity per full-time 
employee is above its median level, the share of precautionary savings in founding equity is also 
above its median level among comparable new ventures; that is, a positive correlation is expected 
between the relative level of founding equity and the relative level of precautionary savings across 
comparable new ventures. The degree of correlation is expected to increase as the degree of 
similarity among new ventures increase. The use of the propensity score matching method as 
described below has the potential to accomplish this; hence, new ventures are characterized by the 
binary variable financial slack with value 1 if founding equity per employee exceeds the median 
level, and 0 otherwise.  
3.2.3. Control variables 
To mitigate a variety of conflating influences on the relationship between equity-based 
financial slack and new venture performance, a number of controls were incorporated in the 
statistical analyzes that are described in detail below. These controls are at the level of the founder, 
firm, industry and sector, and the macro economy. I controlled for the following characteristics of 
the founder: race, gender, years of experience in the industry in which the new business operates 
and the level of education.  
Controls for race are warranted because several studies on entrepreneurship in the U.S. have 
shown that Asians, and to a lesser extent whites, are more likely to start a new venture relative to 
blacks and Latinos (Bates, 1997; Fairlie, 2004; Fairlie and Meyer, 2000; Myrdal, 1944). In addition, 
the latter may not only face far more barriers in credit markets (Blanchard, Zhao and Yinger, 2008), 
but are also more likely to operate their businesses less profitably (Fairlie and Robb, 2007a, 2007b). 
Controls for gender are also warranted based on prior U.S.-based studies that find gender-based 
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differences in the propensity for entrepreneurship, startup capital, access to finance, and sales 
performance (Birley, 1989; Blanchard et al., 2008; Brush, 1992; Kim, 2006; Lee and Rendall, 
2001). Finally, the importance of human capital for both the propensity for entrepreneurship and 
new venture performance justifies the use of controls for the industry experience and the education 
of the founder (Bates, 1995, 1997; Casson, 1995; Dunkelberg, Cooper, Woo and Denis, 1987; Evans 
and Leighton, 1989; Shane, 2003). 
At the firm and industry-sector levels, I controlled for the following: firm size (i.e. number 
of full-time employees), access to bank credit and family loan, industry and sector characteristics. It 
is important to control for firm size because larger firms may have greater earning potential due to 
their better access to strategic resources and capabilities relative to their small counterparts. 
Meanwhile, to the extent that multiple-founder new ventures have greater human capital resources 
relative to single-founder new ventures, new venture performance may be affected by both equity-
based financial slack and human capital slack (Cavarretta and Furr, 2011). To mitigate the 
conflating influence of the latter, only single-founder new ventures were included in the sample.  
The use of controls for access to both bank credit and family loans is justified by the general 
view that financing constraints may force enterprising individuals to forego lucrative commercial 
opportunities. Controls for industry-sector characteristics are warranted because service-based new 
ventures may have better prospects for survival than their counterparts in the manufacturing sector. 
This so because the former are likely to face relatively low entry costs and minimum efficient scale 
requirements (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Arauzo-Carod and Segarra-Blasco, 2005; Bhide, 2000).  
Finally, I controlled for macro-level influences on new venture performance by explicitly 
taking into account the census regions in which the new venture founder is based (i.e. Northeast, 
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Midwest, South and West). This is justified considering the potential for differences in economic 
conditions and institutions across regions (Armington and Acs, 2002; Acs and Armington, 2004 and 
2006; Reynolds, Storey and Westhead, 1994). Cross-regional differences along these lines may not 
only engender cross-regional differences in the rates of new business formation across regions, but 
also in terms of new venture performance. 
3.2.4. Statistical Methods 
In Table 1, summary statistics are provided for the dependent variable (i.e. ROA), 
explanatory variable (i.e. financial slack) and the control variables. To estimate the average effect of 
financial slack on ROA, two estimators were employed. As a starting point, the OLS estimator was 
applied. In a general sense, this estimator may be viewed as a type of matching estimator; that is, 
new ventures are matched on the basis of a vector of covariates. The OLS regression model served 
as the baseline model in this context. The statistical analysis was then taken beyond this baseline 
model with the introduction of the propensity score matching estimator (Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd, 1998; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Unlike the OLS estimator that uses information from a 
set of multi-dimensional covariates to match new ventures, the propensity score matching estimator 
uses information from a single-dimensional scalar variable (i.e. propensity scores) to match new 
ventures. The latter is deemed to be superior because it circumvents the inherent problem of closely 
matching new ventures on the basis of multi-dimensional variables. Furthermore, the propensity 
score matching estimator may do a better job at mitigating sample selection bias or omitted variable 
bias. 
To the extent that the issue of multicollinearity arises, the key concern is whether financial 
slack is correlated with a control variable. It can be seen from Table 1 that there is a negative and 
statistically significant correlation between financial slack and firm size. However, given the 
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relatively small magnitude of the correlation coefficient and the size of sample used in this study, it 
is possible to untangle the average effect of financial slack on new venture performance. To mitigate 
the potential bias in the estimates due to violations of the classical linear regression assumptions 
(i.e. heteroskedasticity), robust standard errors were computed for the OLS estimator; and the 
bootstrapped standard errors were bias-corrected for the propensity score matching estimator. 
Finally, to mitigate endogeneity bias or concerns about reverse causality, financial slack and all 
control variables were measured in 2004, the birth year of the new ventures in the sample; and the 
dependent variable was measured in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to allow for the potentially lagged effects 
of financial slack on new venture performance. The OLS and propensity score matching models 
were estimated using STATA (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4. Results 
The results for the OLS regression model are presented in Table 2. This model can explain 6 
to 7 percent of the variation in ROA over the period 2005 to 2007. Perhaps the most robust results 
across these years are that firm size (i.e. number of full-time employees) has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on ROA, and serviced-based new ventures seem to have a higher ROA 
on average relative to their non-service-based counterparts. While financial slack has been found to 
have a negative effect on ROA, this effect has not been found to be statistically significant over the 
period of study. Thus, while the finding of a negative effect is consistent with the hypothesis stated 
in this paper, the evidence does not strongly support the hypothesis because the magnitude of this 
average effect has not been found to be statistically different from zero. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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The results for the propensity score matching model are presented in Table 3. In panel A, 
probit regression estimates were generated to compute the propensity scores that were used to match 
the new ventures. The probit model can explain 33.1 percent of the variation in financial slack. As 
can be seen, firm size and gender are the primary predictors of whether new ventures will have 
relatively high levels of founding equity. The effect is negative for firm size and positive for gender; 
that is, the probability that new ventures will have a relatively high level of founding equity is 
relatively high for small and male-owned business startups. The propensity score matching 
estimates of the average effect of financial slack on ROA are reported in panel B of Table 3.  For all 
the years (i.e. 2005-2007) and matching methods (i.e. nearest neighbor, radius, kernel and 
stratification matching) considered, the average effect is not only found to be negative, but also 
statistically significant either at the 5 or 10 percent level of significance in 2006. The estimates of 
this average effect range from -16.8 to -25.4 percent over the period of study; hence, the average 
effect is significant in economic terms. Altogether, the results strongly support the hypothesis 
articulated by this study. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study has examined the question of whether new ventures that start out with relatively 
high levels of founding equity subsequently have a relatively low rate of profitability on average. It 
primarily contributes to the existing literature on financial slack and firm performance by providing 
new systematic evidence that suggests that relatively high levels of founding equity may adversely 
impact the performance of new ventures during the birth stage of the entrepreneurial process. 
Specifically, it has been found that the average return on assets for new ventures with relatively high 
13 
 
levels of founding equity may be as much as 25 percent lower than that of comparable new ventures 
with relatively low levels of founding equity during the early years of operations.  
The adverse effects of equity-based financial slack are attributed to the following two 
mechanisms. First, to the extent that relatively high levels of founding equity translates into 
relatively high levels of precautionary savings, the founder may be sacrificing higher risk-adjusted 
returns on a variety of commercial activities for a potentially sustainable growth rate. Second, the 
presence of precautionary savings may not only encourage founders to stick with ineffective 
business models, but may also draw their attention away from the potential customers that they 
ought to pursue (Cavarretta and Furr, 2011). These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and 
may jointly contribute to relatively low rates of profitability. 
By conceptualizing financial slack in terms of working capital and founding equity, this 
paper provides a basis for studying the effect of financial slack on the performance of both new 
ventures and relatively established entrepreneurial firms. Studies at the intersection of 
entrepreneurship and management that exclusively apply the working capital-based measure of 
financial slack are likely to ignore new ventures with little, if any, excess working capital. But the 
availability of this equity-based construct of financial slack provides a basis for the development of 
resource-growth theory that is specifically tailored to new ventures.  
Finally, the finding that relatively high levels of founding equity may hurt new venture 
performance suggests that it can no longer be taken for granted that ‘more capital is better than less’ 
as it relates to new ventures. Thus, it is worthwhile for scholars to further explore in future studies 
how new ventures may make better use of apparently limited internal capital without compromising 
their capacity to absorb unexpected losses that may materialize over the course of business 
development and growth.  
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and correlations in the year of birth, 2004 
 Mean SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Financial slack a 
 
0.479 
 
 0.500  
 
1.000 
     
2. Firm size b 2.914 
 
 3.776  
 
-0.414*** 1.000     
3. Service-based c 0.881 
 
 0.324  
 
0.061 0.012 1.000    
4. Bank credit d  0.229 
 
 0.421  
 
-0.041 0.124*** -0.064 1.000   
5. Family loan d  0.121 
 
 0.327 
 
0.057 -0.066 -0.033 -0.006 1.000  
6. High-tech industry c  0.139 
 
 0.347  
 
0.043 -0.061 0.008 0.028 -0.030 1.000 
 
7. Census region e 2.616 1.026 
 
0.043 0.002 -0.063 0.017 -0.049 0.170*** 
 
8. Industry experience 
of founder (years) 14.142 10.863 
 
-0.092* 0.077 0.155*** -0.141** -0.162*** 0.052 
 
9.     Caucasian f 0.863 0.344 
 
-0.011 0.033 0.035 0.031 -0.112* -0.010 
 
10.   Education f 6.445 2.126 
 
0.003 0.011 0.002 0.002 -0.091+ 0.133** 
 
11.   Gender f 0.768 0.422 
 
0.014 0.055 0.045 -0.005 -0.041 0.036 
    
12.   Sector c 49.784 15.140 
 
0.040 -0.073 0.176 -0.041 -0.033 -0.132** 
          
    7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
7. Census region e  
 
   
 
1.000      
 
8. Industry experience 
of founder (years)   
 
   
 
-0.062 1.000     
9. Caucasian f  
 
 
 
-0.118** 0.082+ 1.000    
10. Education f  
 
 
 
0.071 0.113* -0.033 1.000   
11. Gender f  
 
 
 
-0.050 0.237*** 0.137** -0.033 1.000  
 
12. Sector c   
 
-0.066 -0.049 -0.070 0.112* -0.072 1.000 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001; n = 445. 
a 
financial slack status has value 1 if founding equity per employee exceeds the median level, 0 otherwise. 
b 
firm size = number of full-time employees. 
c 
service-based = 1 if new venture provides a service, 0 otherwise; high-tech industry = 1 if new venture  
  operates in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; sector refers to the 20 broad NAICS sectors. 
d 
bank credit = 1 if founder has a bank loan, 0 otherwise; family loan = 1 if founder has a family loan,  
  0 otherwise. 
e
 census region (location of founder): 1, Northeast; 2 – Midwest; 3 – South, and 4 – West. 
f
 caucasian = 1 if the founder is white, 0 otherwise; education (of founder) : 1 - less than 9
th
 grade,  
  2 – some  high school, but no diploma, 3 – high school graduate (diploma or GED), 4 – technical, trade or  
  vocational degree, 5 – some college, but no degree, 6 – associate’s degree, 7 – bachelor’s degree, 8 – some    
  graduate school but no degree, 9 – master’s degree, and 10 – professional school or doctorate. 
  gender (of founder) = 1 if the male, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 
OLS estimates of the effect of financial slack on return on assets. 
 2005  2006  2007 
 Estimates Robust SE  Estimates Robust SE  Estimates Robust SE 
Financial slack 
a
 -12.412 11.251  -11.363 8.516  -13.395 9.982 
Firm size 
b
 -4.872
***
 1.167  -2.987
*
 1.518  -3.958
**
 1.447 
Service-based 
c
 23.505
+
 13.066  25.055
*
 11.942  33.912
+
 18.109 
Bank credit 
d
 -3.835 10.083  11.980 8.882  9.748 10.947 
Family loan 
d
 -18.169 18.396  -16.401 14.807  -17.536 16.298 
High-tech industry 
c
 -18.445 21.629  -26.879
*
 13.121  -13.684 13.061 
Industry experience 
of founder (years) 0.297 0.526 
 
0.307 0.395 
 
0.668 0.441 
Caucasian 
f
 35.807 22.648  10.479 13.660  6.550 16.818 
Education 
f
 1.137 2.272  1.554 1.783  3.190 2.515 
Gender 
f
 4.132 12.881  24.222
*
 10.413  22.474
*
 11.436 
Sector controls 
c
 Yes   Yes   Yes  
Regional controls 
e
 Yes   Yes   Yes  
Constant -46.211 32.842  -43.126 27.790  -52.283 42.935 
R
2
 0.060   0.070   0.065  
Observations 445   445   445  
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001. 
a 
financial slack status has value 1 if founding equity per employee exceeds the median level, 0 otherwise. 
b 
firm size = number of full-time employees. 
c 
service-based = 1 if new venture provides a service, 0 otherwise; high-tech industry = 1 if new venture  
  operates in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; sector refers to the 20 broad NAICS sectors. 
d 
bank credit = 1 if founder has a bank loan, 0 otherwise; family loan = 1 if founder has a family loan,  
  0 otherwise. 
e
 census region (location of founder): 1, Northeast; 2 – Midwest; 3 – South, and 4 – West. 
f
 caucasian = 1 if the founder is white, 0 otherwise; education (of founder) : 1 - less than 9
th
 grade,  
  2 – some  high school, but no diploma, 3 – high school graduate (diploma or GED), 4 – technical, trade or  
  vocational degree, 5 – some college, but no degree, 6 – associate’s degree, 7 – bachelor’s degree, 8 – some    
  graduate school but no degree, 9 – master’s degree, and 10 – professional school or doctorate. 
  gender (of founder) = 1 if the male, 0 otherwise. 
  Note: All regressors are measured in 2004, the year of the new ventures’ birth. 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Probit regression estimates for the computation of propensity scores.  
   
 Estimates  SE 
Firm size 
b
 -0.792
***
  0.090 
Service-based 
c
 0.147  0.235 
Bank credit 
d
 0.287  0.189 
Family loan 
d
 0.206  0.234 
High-tech industry 
c
  0.025  0.209 
Industry experience of founder (years) -0.009  0.007 
Caucasian 
f
 -0.146  0.216 
Education 
f
 0.016  0.035 
Gender 
f
 0.327
+
  0.173 
Sectoral controls 
c
 Yes   
Regional controls 
e
 Yes   
Constant 1.182
*
  0.518 
Pseudo R
2
 0.331   
Observations 445   
 
Panel B. Propensity score matching estimates of the average effect of financial-slack 
a
 on return on assets. 
 2005  2006  2007 
Matching method Estimates 
Bootstrapped 
SE 
g
 
 
Estimates 
Bootstrapped 
SE 
g
 
 
Estimates 
Bootstrapped 
SE 
g
 
Nearest neighbor 
matching  -13.277 17.373  -25.385
*
 10.743  -7.068 17.379 
         
Radius matching  -19.699 14.586  -16.957
+
 10.095  -12.299 16.271 
         
Kernel matching  -18.387 14.932  -16.813
+
 9.669  -13.661 14.822 
         
Stratification 
matching  -20.322 12.685  -18.266
*
 9.054  -16.900 12.984 
 
+
p<.10; 
*
p<.05; 
**
p<.01; 
***
p< .001.  
a 
financial slack status has value 1 if founding equity per employee exceeds the median level, 0 otherwise. 
b 
firm size = number of full-time employees. 
c 
service-based = 1 if new venture provides a service, 0 otherwise; high-tech industry = 1 if new venture  
  operates in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise; sector refers to the 20 broad NAICS sectors. 
d 
bank credit = 1 if founder has a bank loan, 0 otherwise; family loan = 1 if founder has a family loan,  
  0 otherwise. 
e
 census region (location of founder): 1, Northeast; 2 – Midwest; 3 – South, and 4 – West. 
f
 caucasian = 1 if the founder is white, 0 otherwise; education (of founder) : 1 - less than 9
th
 grade,  
  2 – some  high school, but no diploma, 3 – high school graduate (diploma or GED), 4 – technical, trade or  
  vocational degree, 5 – some college, but no degree, 6 – associate’s degree, 7 – bachelor’s degree, 8 – some    
  graduate school but no degree, 9 – master’s degree, and 10 – professional school or doctorate. 
  gender (of founder) = 1 if the male, 0 otherwise. 
g
 bootstrapped standard errors are bias-corrected. 
  Note: All regressors are measured in 2004, the year of new ventures’ birth. 
 
